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I. INTRODUCTION  
The current unprecedented Covid-19 Pandemic not only causes a global health crisis but also 
leads to tremendous economic challenges to the world. In the United Kingdom, it is estimated 
that the national Gross Domestic Product will fall by eleven per cent in 2020, the biggest 
economic recession in the past three centuries.1 In fact, crises tend to produce a series of social, 
economic and legal changes. Understanding the complex relationship between crises and legal 
responses is also crucial to appreciating the dynamics of the society. In this context, Professor 
Virginia Torrie’s recent book, Reinventing Bankruptcy Law: A History of the Companies’ Creditors 
Arrangement Act, may be particularly relevant, since this book offers an in-depth explanation 
over how the economic crisis could change the course of law development.  
Specifically, Torrie uses the historic trajectory of the Canadian corporate reorganization 
law, the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, in the twentieth century to vividly demonstrate 
how the development of this law was shaped by its social, economic and political backgrounds 
and how statutes could be expansively interpreted to pursue pragmatic needs.2  
This book presents a unique angle through which the development of law can be more 
profoundly understood and without which the complexity of law development may be 
underestimated. Torrie’s contribution in this book is not only remarkably valuable for legal 
scholars but also equally helpful for scholars in the fields of history, sociology and politics. This 
review considers two major arguments presented in this book.  
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II. ECONOMIC CRISES USUALLY TRIGGER THE LAW MAKING, OR RESHAPE THE LAW, TO 
HANDLE EMERGING URGENCY   
The enactment of the Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act in 1933 was mainly a 
response to the Great Depression beginning from 1929 in the industrialized world including 
Canada. 3 This Act was made to fill a gap, since under the then national bankruptcy law, 
liquidating a failed company was the only option, but this Act sought a corporate rehabilitation 
outcome.  
In the 1930s’ Canada, bondholders were powerful players in the financial markets, many 
of them insurance or loan companies that held floating charges over borrowers’ assets and 
businesses. As precisely pointed out by Torrie in this book, the creation of the Companies’ 
Creditors Arrangement Act was made for the benefit of bondholders rather than for debtor 
companies, since this Act offered the debt compromise procedure only for companies having 
bondholders as creditors. For companies that did not raise funds from bond markets, this Act 
did not apply. This law was a remedy for bondholders.  
The Companies’ Creditor Arrangement Act was arguably a corporate rescue law on the 
grounds that it facilitated corporate reorganization over liquidation. If an 
arrangement/reorganization plan could be agreed by the creditors and the debtor company, the 
company as a going concern would remain in business and a destructive liquidation could be 
avoided, as a result of which creditors, especially bondholders, could reap the benefits 
generated by the company in the future. It was a win-win solution.  
After the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act was passed in 1933, it was frequently 
used by bondholders to reorganise their financially troubled but economically viable customer 
companies especially in the 1930s and 1940s. But since the 1950s, mainly because of the 
economic prosperity after the World War II, the booming economy in Canada saw the sharply 
declined use of this Act. Decades later, in the 1980s, the new round of economic recession 
reminded Canadian business communities the usefulness of the Companies’ Creditors 
Arrangement Act, leading to its recovery.4  
Torrie’s analysis explains that the 1980s economic recession did not result in law-
making, instead it interestingly found the re-interpretation of the Companies’ Creditors 
Arrangement Act to address the consequence of mass company failures. This time, it was not 
the parliament enacting or amending the law to suit practical needs; by contrast, it is the 
Canadian law courts expansively interpreting this Act as a remedy for debtor companies, rather 
than for bondholders as initially designed. A great number of debtor companies strategically 
used the Act for reorganization in the 1980s and 1990s in Canada, since in many cases a bond 
issuance could be artificially created for the only purpose of accessing the reorganization 
procedure under this Act, and since, more important, law courts would give the green light in 
the consideration that it served the interests of a wide range of parties, including employees, 
shareholders and the society at large. Technically speaking, the judicial lenience seemed to 
have gone too far. But again, the emergency of economic recession demanded an extraordinary 
action to alleviate the impacts of the crisis. The 1980s economic crisis in Canada helped update 
this Act, albeit no action from the legislature was involved. 
In view of this book’s crisis-leading-to-law-making pathway, it is far easier to appreciate 
the wave of legislative reforms following the 2007-8 global financial crisis in some major 
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jurisdictions. For example, the USA enacted the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 in an effort to contain 
the ripple effects of failed financial institutions,5 and the UK promulgated the Banking Act 2009 
to respond to bank insolvencies.6   
III. INTEREST GROUPS HELP RESHAPE THE LAW 
Although law is made by a legislative body, its implementation is probably beyond the 
legislature’s control. Torrie’s book offers a fascinating account of how the users of the Canadian 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act contributed to the dynamics of this law in the judicial 
practice.  
As noted before, this Act was originally made as a relief for bondholders to restructure 
their borrowers. But in the 1930s and 1940s, due to the intrinsic ambiguity of the statute, many 
debtor companies applied to use this Act to avoid liquidation in the absence of bondholders’ 
involvement, and in light of the strength of this Act in preserving going concern value, in most 
cases, law courts allowed companies to proceed. The court support in fact created a Chapter-
11-style debtor-in-possession regime in Canada, since the debtor’s management could remain 
in office if a Companies’ Creditor Arrangement procedure could be voluntarily opened in the 
court.  
However, for fear of the potential abuse of this debtor-in-possession scheme under the 
Act, many creditor groups fiercely opposed the voluntary action by debtor companies 
themselves. In 1952, perhaps because of this concern, the Canadian parliament amended this 
law and prohibited the voluntary application. The celebrated debtor-in-possession scheme 
unfortunately saw its abrupt end in Canada. For this reason and others, prior to its resumption 
in the 1980s, this Act fell largely into disuse. This is much like what happened in the USA when 
the debtor-in-possession control model under the Bankruptcy Code was abolished in the 1930s, 
leading to its dramatic decline thereafter, until its re-installation by the 1978 amendment.7  
The drama turned to a reversal in the 1980s, a time when the new economic crisis hit 
Canada hard. Since a corporate reorganization law was still unavailable, insolvent companies 
desperately needed a debtor-friendly law for survival. In the absence of alternatives, the 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act was invoked again. For this era, debtor companies 
became more strategic than before. To fulfil the entry requirement of having bondholders, some 
instant bond issuances were made to meet the eligibility test, thereby many companies could 
resort to this Act to avoid the use of the bankruptcy liquidation law.  
Arguably, if a company deliberately created a bond-issuance shortly before applying for 
a Companies’ Creditors Arrangement procedure, this action might be deemed to be conducted 
in bad faith and substantially violated the entry requirement. Strictly speaking, at least, this 
strategy would be considerably vulnerable to a legal attack. In this circumstance, it was 
Canadian law courts that expansively interpreted the eligibility requirement and ruled in favour 
of a corporate rescue effort in the knowledge that a wide range of parties, including employees, 
suppliers and even local communities, could benefit from rehabilitating a business. This 
effectively meant that it was debtor companies with the support of law courts remaking the law.  
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The judicial open-mindedness offered to debtor companies in the 1980s and 1990s was not 
made in a vacuum. Torrie discusses the fact that two global trends of law development in this 
period might have also emboldened Canadian judges to lend their support to rescuing efforts, 
whoever initiated the rescue application. First, in 1978, the USA overhauled its Bankruptcy Code 
and re-introduced debtor-in-possession in Chapter 11, which to a certain extent might have 
influenced the Canadian judicial sector to adopt a pro-rescue and pro-debtor-in-possession 
interpretation. Like its southern neighbour, Canada also deserved a rescue-friendly insolvency 
law to save distressed companies. The most suitable candidate was the Companies’ Creditors 
Arrangement Act, which could be used to fill the gap.  
Second, the global debate about the choice between the shareholder primacy theory 
and the stakeholder theory clearly tilted in favour of the latter in the 1980s. Rescuing a failed 
company could see its social and economic gains in preserving jobs and in maximising the 
return to creditors. Supported by politicians, the Canadian judges creatively expanded the use 
of this Act so as to provide relief to over-indebted companies. Torrie’s arguments greatly help 
the reader to better understand what happens beneath the vibrancy of law development in 
Canada and beyond.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are more well-articulated thoughts about the interaction between law and society in 
Torrie’s book. This review only selects the aforementioned two themes to recommend this book. 
To a large extent, this book is likely to be the extension of Carruthers and Halliday’s masterpiece, 
Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in England and the United 
States.8 More important, it is worth emphasising that Torrie’s book is not only useful for the 
reader to appreciate the dynamics of law development in Canada but also considerably 
enriches the global debate over how law development is intrinsically intertwined with political 
and economic priorities.  
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